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Rethinking Force Majeure in
Public International Law
by Myanna Dellinger*
I. Introduction
Climate change is one of today’s most significant and
complex problems. The number and level of severity of
extreme weather events is increasing rapidly around the
world.1 One year after the next, we learn that heat records
have been broken once again.2 Climate change has been traced
*After a successful first career in international communications and
university instruction on two continents, Professor Dellinger graduated from
law school at the top of her class at the University of Oregon School of Law
(Order of the Coif). Professor Dellinger is an Associate Professor of Law with
the University of South Dakota School of Law where she teaches, among
other things, Sales, Public International Law, International Business
Transactions, and International Human Rights. She researches and writes
extensively on the intersection between international business and
environmental law with a particular focus on climate change. Professor
Dellinger is also the Editor-in-Chief of the Contracts Prof Blog, where her
blogs often address environmental issues that intersect with business. She
started and hosts the popular Global Energy and Environmental Law
Podcast on iTunes. Professor Dellinger is the Chair of the International
Environmental Law section of the American Branch of the International Law
Association. She is a Fulbright Scholar and a peer reviewer for the National
Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Program. She has visited
thirty-six nations for business and pleasure. Many thanks to Ashley Brost,
J.D. Candidate 2017, the University of South Dakota School of Law, for her
excellent research assistance.
1.
See NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, EXTREME WEATHER (2014),
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/extreme-weather
(discussing how severe weather and extreme climate events have increased
over the last five decades).
2. See 2016 Climate Trends Continue to Break Records, NASA (July 19,
2016), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/climate-trends-continueto-break-records (stating “global surface temperatures . . . have broken
numerous records through the first half of 2016”); Climate Council, 2016:
Heat Record Broken Again, CLIMATE COUNCIL (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/2016-hottest-year-report (noting the global
average temperature of 2016 was warmer than the previous temperature
record set in 2015).

455

1

456

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37:2

to a wide range of severe problems around the world, ranging
from the obvious damage caused by hurricanes, floods, extreme
rainfall, prolonged droughts, wildfires and a host of other
weather-related issues to the perhaps less obvious such as
physical and mental illnesses, “civil unrest, riots, mass
migrations and perhaps wars caused by water and food
shortages.”3 “It is no longer rationally debatable that climate
change will take a huge toll on human health and prosperity as
well as pose significant risks to national security if it is not
curbed.”4
Science has demonstrated that human activity is
“extremely likely” to have contributed significantly to this
increasingly volatile and problematic weather situation.5 At
the same time, the developed nations that, to a very large
extent, caused the climate change problem also clearly
indicated in the negotiations leading up to the new Paris
Agreement on climate change, as well as in the Agreement
itself, that they are not willing to accept financial liability for
any loss and damage caused by climate change.6 The matter is,
at bottom, one of an alleged lack of sufficient resources and a
similarly alleged inability to correctly apportion liability for the
problem along with, of course, lack of political will to undertake
legal responsibility for the financially severe consequences that
are likely to arise because of climate change.
However, financial liability for loss and damage caused by
severe weather events may arise not only under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
regime, but also under established notions of customary
international law such as the “no harm” rule, which creates a
3. Myanna Dellinger, An “Act of God”? Rethinking Contractual
Impracticability in an Era of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 1551, 1553 (2016).
4. Id.
5. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013:
The Physical Science Basis, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3, 17 (2013),
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter IPCC I].
6. See U.N. Paris Agreement art. 8, opened for signature Apr. 22, 2016
(entered into force Nov. 4, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Paris Agreement]; Wil
Burns, Loss and Damage and the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 415 (2016) (citations omitted).
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duty not to allow one’s territory to be used in ways that cause
harm to other states.7 In this context, nation states may seek
to avoid a finding of legal wrongfulness under the force
majeure, necessity, or distress doctrines of law. This article
analyzes whether nations will be able to do so and critiques the
arguments that are likely to arise in invoking these defenses.
Many of the arguments that have traditionally been viable and
that made legal (as well as practical) sense no longer do so
given modern knowledge about climate change and its causes
and effects.
The article proceeds as follows: The history of the excuse
doctrines that could and are applied in the context of “severe
weather” will be briefly described to create a view of current
law in the light of its development over time. Similarly, the
traditional legal distinction between “man” and “nature” will be
examined as this differentiation, at worst, no longer makes
sense in relation to climate change and, at best, is one without
significance. Because this article solely addresses the excuse
doctrines that may apply to legal liability on nation states in
the climate change context, the Paris Agreement on climate
change (the “Agreement”) becomes relevant as it would have
been fair and equitable to apportion loss and damage under
this Agreement. However, as the Agreement explicitly states
that developed nations will not be liable for loss and damage
under the treaty provisions,8 the article will proceed to analyze
alternative theories of nation state responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts. Finally, the article critiques the
modern potential applicability of these doctrines for reasons of
law and public policy.

7. See generally ‘No-Harm Rule’ and Climate Change, LEGAL RESPONSE
INITIATIVE
(July
24,
2012),
http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/BP42E-Briefing-Paper-No-Harm-Rule-and-ClimateChange-24-July-2012.pdf [hereinafter No-Harm Rule].
8. Article 8 of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement states that the Agreement
will “not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” for loss
and damage. See U.N. Paris Agreement, supra note 6.
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II. History of Weather-related Excuses
In public international law, the doctrines of force majeure,
necessity, and distress operate to preclude the legal
wrongfulness of an act.9 The doctrines are invoked in the
context of alleged “irresistible forces” or “unforeseen events”
that the party or nation state in question could neither have
prevented nor controlled. Such events include climatic events
such as hurricanes, heavy rain, windstorms, blizzards, and
floods.
“The majority of legal systems of the world have adopted
rules concerning the consequences of the occurrence of
irresistible, unforeseen or unforeseeable, or uncontrollable
supervening events in the validity or performance of legal
obligations.”10 The rules appear in “treaties, practice, case-law,
and doctrinal commentary.”11 They are known by a variety of
terms such as “force majeure, fortuitous event[s], impossibility,
acts of God, unavoidable necessity, physical necessity,
frustration, [and] impracticability.”12 Yet, all these notions
cover the notion of what has often simply become known as
“force majeure.”13
The origin of force majeure can be traced to ancient Roman
law.14 It then—as now—applied to the legal consequences of
supervening events that had a demonstrable causal connection
to injurious consequences.15
“In the following centuries,
domestic legal systems would borrow from these notions to
develop their own rules concerning allocation of risk in the
view of the occurrence of supervening events.”16
Public
international law came to realize that “the breach of
international obligations [could be] justified or excused due to
9. ALINA KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 453 (5th
ed. 2015).
10. Federica I. Paddeu, A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International
Law, 82 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 381, 385 (2012).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 385-86.
14. Id. at 386.
15. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 386.
16. Id. at 386-87.
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the occurrence of supervening events.”17 States have long been
considered to have a natural law duty of self-preservation:
‘[A] nation is bound to preserve itself’. In view of
this duty, the state ‘ought to avoid those things
which can bring about its destruction’, but only
insofar as it is in its power since ‘no one is bound
to do the impossible’ . . . . ‘[T]hat which is to be
imputed to bad fortune, and is not subject to our
control, must be patiently endured and entrusted
to divine providence’. [But] [j]ust as it was
impossible for a man ‘to resist a superior force’,
so it was impossible for a state to ‘protect itself
from destruction by a superior force’.
As
examples of this superior force, [one writer]
referred to earthquakes, extraordinary floods,
‘the wrongful act of a stronger nation’ or internal
struggles, famines or pestilences, all of which
could bring about the destruction of the state.18
In private law, the notion that what later became known
as “acts of God” could work to provide a defense to liability that
first appeared in English-language common law in 1581 in the
famous English “Shelley’s Case,” where it was found that the
death of a party to the contract made performance impossible.19
The notion of an “act of God” evolved from the early (almost
literal) construct to mean something beyond human agency and
control, such as severe weather events.20 Courts sitting in torts
found that, for reasons of fairness, parties should not be found
negligent for failing to prevent the negative effects of events
which they could neither reasonably have foreseen nor
prevented.21 This “act of God” doctrine worked its way beyond
torts law into admiralty, private national and international

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1565.
Id. at 1601.
Id.
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contracts law, and environmental law in English-speaking
countries.22
Today, the doctrine of force majeure is very relevant to a
range of different situations facing nation states. For example,
it has been applied to the question of the suspension and
continued validity of treaties: “[I]f the state that has promised
succours finds herself unable to furnish them, her inability
alone is sufficient to dispense with the obligation; and if she
cannot give her assistance without exposing herself to evident
danger, this circumstance also dispenses with it.”23 This raises
the question of whether nation states may use the doctrine to
avoid treaty obligations or seek retreat from the UNFCCC
and/or the Paris Agreement because of problems caused by
climate change while, at the same time, having contributed to
the problem as all nation states have. This could be the topic of
further research, but is outside the scope of this article.
“The most commonly quoted example [of the idea] was that
of an irresistible force,” which may preclude the legal
wrongfulness of a natural force, such as a storm, forcing a
vessel to enter a foreign, but closed, port.24 Under such
circumstances, the “vessel [is] not subject to the consequences
of [the] entry.”25 Force majeure also allows “innocent passage
through neutral waters to a belligerent vessel during war.”26
Under the law of war, “blockades could be affected by force
majeure in numerous ways.”27 Neutral vessels may enter a
“blockaded port without breach of the blockade making it liable
to capture in cases of force majeure.”28 Tsunamis may “damage
a nuclear plant, rendering it impossible for [a] state . . . to
provide energy to a neighbouring state.”29 Hunger so severe
may arise from continued droughts that nations with
populations at risk of famine may fail to perform international
obligations to deliver crops to other nations, preferring instead
22. Id. at 1567.
23. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 403 (citing MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, LAW OF
NATIONS § 92 (1883)).
24. Id. at 405.
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 407.
28. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 407 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 463.
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to feed its own obligations.30 In these and other situations,
nation states may invoke the excuse doctrines to prevent a
finding of legal wrongfulness on their parts. However, as will
be demonstrated below, they may still be held legally liable for
the financial consequences of their actions or non-actions,
although these were not legally wrongful. This is a significant
differentiation and concern in the context of climate change
with the recognized risks of costly consequences to both public
and private entities around the world.
III. “Man v. Nature” Distinction
The notion that some events are beyond the control of
humankind runs beneath the excuse doctrines in both public
and private law. But from where does this notion stem?
Humankind has, for a long time, distinguished between
what may be considered to be acts of “God” or “nature” on one
side, or “man” on the other. “We still distinguish between what
is ‘man-made’ and what is ‘natural’ in many contexts.”31 “We
think we ‘react’ to – or adapt to - natural events rather than
‘create’ them”32 even in spite of today’s clear scientific
knowledge that we are greatly affecting our natural
environment. We tend to see ourselves as separate and almost
untouchable entities somewhat removed from and superior to
the natural world we inhibit.33 This is a “viewpoint that is
becoming archaic and that is challenged to an increasing,
“Our
although still somewhat controversial, extent.”34
thoughts about what ‘nature’ is and is not generate
consequences for humankind and for our environment”35 via
the laws and policies we create and thus the action or inaction
in relation to such issues as climate change.
The law still encompasses these views to a very large
extent. For example, United States food labeling requirements
and practices distinguish between such notions as “manmade,”
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1568.
Id.
Id. at 1567.
Id. at 1568.
Id.
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“natural,” “organic,” “processed,” or “unprocessed.”36 Drug and
cosmetics labeling similarly differentiate between the natural
and the man-made. Arguably, this makes little sense given the
fact that all marketed food products require some form of
human participation. “Separation of the human and the
‘natural’ is increasingly being recognized in this context as
more of a [continuum than a sharp] division . . . .”37
“Public land use law in the United States is also marked by
a significant debate about what is ‘natural’ and what is
‘human.’”38 The Wilderness Act, for example, made early use of
such attempts at differentiating man from nature as classifying
whether an area was “untrammeled by man.’”39
“The
Wilderness Act defined the purpose of wilderness not in terms
of any inherent value, but in terms of its value as a ‘resource’
for human use, enjoyment, and consumption.”40 The legal
differentiation between human entities as natural entities and
the rest of nature remains clear, albeit arguably no longer
logical given our severe interference with our natural
environment.
At bottom, many of the events that have the greatest
impacts on us today can be traced to human action or
inaction.41 We cannot continue blaming nature for all the
consequences of our actions that we currently witness. “We are
simply not separate from nature; we are an integral
physiological part of it. Just as nature has an effect on us, so
do we have a clear effect on it.”42 In few other contexts does
this have a clearer practical impact than when it comes to
climate change. Continuing to ascribe “extreme” weather
events to “nature” or “God” makes little sense given today’s
readily available knowledge about the scientific causes and
36. Jill M. Fraley, Re-Examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
669, 681-82 (2010).
37. Id. at 682.
38. Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569. See also id.; Sean Kammer,
Coming to Terms with Wilderness: The Wilderness Act and the Problem of
Wildlife Restoration, 43 ENVTL. L. 83, 109 (2013).
39. Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569; Fraley, supra note 36, at 682.
40. Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569 (citing National Wilderness
Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012)).
41. Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1569.
42. Id.
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effects of climate change: IPCC scientists are 95 to 100%
certain that the cause is human activity.43 The law relating to
defenses based on weather calamities ought to reflect modern
factual reality.
“[A]s our understanding of our natural
surroundings improves,”44 so should the law and its judicial
applications. “For example, where underground water flows
were once also seen as ‘mysterious’ and inexplicable
phenomena, science has now documented how and where water
flows. Water law changed with this understanding.”45 So
should the law in relation to climate change loss and damage.
Time has now come to rethink the ability of nation states,
as well as private parties, to avoid financial liability based on
weather events that were once successfully argued to be
unpreventable and unforeseeable by the parties. “Extreme”
weather events are no longer so; they are becoming the order of
the day. “[L]aw is itself a human construct.”46 Excuse
doctrines based on unwarranted perceptions that we have not
and cannot affect the weather must be reconstructed to reflect
modern on-the-ground reality. The law is often considered to
adapt too slowly to the realities of modern life, such as in the
technical areas and, here, the scientific and meteorological. At
the same time, the general public is losing faith in the
judiciary’s ability to progressively solve some of today’s most
urgent societal problems.47 If willing to reinterpret those parts
of the weather-related excuse doctrines that are left to the
discretion of the courts, judges would be able to regain some of
that faith. Doing so may arguably also act as impetus for
legislatures around the world to review the unfortunate
inaction and unwillingness to take the regulatory action that is
so urgently needed to stem the super-wicked problem of climate
change. Needless to say, the codifications of such concepts of
force majeure, necessity, and distress ought similarly to take
changing weather realities and the effects thereof on legal
liability into account.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

IPCC I, supra note 5, at 4, n.1, 17.
Dellinger, supra note 3, at 1570.
Id.
Id. at 1569.
Id. at 1591.
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IV. Liability for Loss and Damage under the Paris
Agreement
Climate change has long been recognized to present the
risk of costly adverse consequences on both private and public
funds. These include “an array of potential economic impacts,
such as damage to infrastructure from coastal erosion and
flooding, declines in crop production, or loss of fisheries.”48
Moreover, climate change poses a very real risk of “noneconomic damages, such as loss of biodiversity and ecosystem
services, loss of culture and sovereignty, and decline of
indigenous knowledge.”49
These risks are not insignificant. In fact, climate change
may manifest itself in impacts of a potentially “inconceivable
magnitude.”50 Although there has been very little detailed
research to date to quantify potential loss and damage costs
over this century and beyond, the estimates that have been
made are truly daunting. For example, the UNFCCC has
found that it could cost about “USD 70-100 billion per year by
2030 to deal with the worst impacts of climate change.”51
Others estimate the true annual cost to reach USD 300 billion
or more.52
A recent study by the non-governmental
organization Action Aid pegged the mean cost of climate
change impacts at $275 trillion between 2000 and 2200.53 The
48. Burns, supra note 6, at 418.
49. Id.
50. Framing the Loss and Damage debate: A conversation starter by the
Loss and Damage Vulnerable Countries Initiative, LOSS & DAMAGE, Aug.
2012, at 1, 3, https://www.germanwatch.org/fr/download/6673.pdf [hereinafter
Framing]. See also Ainun Nishat et al., A Range of Approaches to Address
Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts in Bangladesh, LOSS &
DAMAGE, June 2013, at 1, 24, http://www.loss-and-damage.net/download/
7069.pdf.
51. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 3. See also Investment and
Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2007),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/financial_flows.pdf.
52. See Martin Parry et al., Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate
Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and Other Recent Estimates, INT’L INST.
FOR ENV’T & DEV, Aug. 2009, at 1, http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/11501IIED.pdf.
53. Lies Craeynest, Loss and damage from climate change: the cost for
poor people in developing countries, ACT!ONAID, Nov. 2010, at 1, 11,
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African Climate Policy Center of the United National Economic
Commission for Africa’s assessment of potential loss and
damage on the continent concluded that these impacts could
reduce GDP in many sectors between 1% (in a “2°C World”) up
to 5% (in a “4+°C World).”54 Of course, losses are not only
monetary in nature, but may well take on life and death
consequences as well. “A report of the Global Humanitarian
Forum estimated that climate change already causes 300,000
deaths per year throughout the world and seriously impacts
the lives of 325 million people.”55
This sobering reality has led to increasing focus on the
concept that has become known as “loss and damage.”56 While
the term “loss and damage” is not defined under the UNFCCC
or other legal instruments, a generally recognized definition is
“those impacts of climate change that will neither be mitigated,
nor adapted to.”57 Burns has stated:
In this context, ‘loss’ is construed as
‘irrecoverable negative impacts,’ such as loss of
freshwater resources or culture or heritage, while
‘damage’ are climatic manifestations from which
http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/loss_and_damage__discussion_paper_by_actionaid-_nov_2010.pdf.
54. Michiel Schaeffer et.al, Loss and Damage in Africa, U.N. ECON.
COMM’N
FOR
AFR.,
May
2014,
at
1,
17,
http://www.uncclearn.org/sites/default/files/inventory/uneca32.pdf.
55. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 3. See also GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN
FORUM, HUMAN IMPACT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE – THE ANATOMY OF A SILENT
CRISIS
1,
1
(2009),
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9668_humanimpactreport1.pdf.
56. See generally Burns, supra note 6.
57. Mizan R. Khan et al., Assessing Microinsurance as a Tool to Address
Loss and Damage in the National Context of Bangladesh, LOSS & DAMAGE,
June 2013, at 1, 9, http://loss-and-damage.net/download/7078.pdf. See also
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 1 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf
(stating that residual loss and damage will occur from climate change despite
mitigation and adaptation action); Urmi Goswami, UN Climate Change
Negotiations 2012: Developing and developed countries divided on ‘loss and
damage’,
ECON.
TIMES
(Dec.
8,
2012,
6:26
AM),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/un-climate-changenegotiations-2012-developing-and-developed-countries-divided-on-loss-anddamage/articleshow/17528764.cms.
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ecosystems and human institutions can recover,
such as impacts on infrastructure related to
violent weather events or damage to mangroves
from coastal surges.58
In short, climate change will have severe financial and
other impacts on nations and their constituents in the years to
come.
Perhaps precisely because of the sheer potential
magnitude of the problem of climate change, developed nations
have, so far, no matter how inequitably this may appear,
refused to accept any legally binding loss and damage
provisions under the Paris Agreement. Ultimately, the parties
to the UNFCCC opted not to establish a discrete loss and
damage mechanism under the Agreement, but rather to make
the existing loss and damage provision under the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (“WIM”)
“subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to [the Paris]
Agreement” (“CMP”).59 In other words, the WIM is still
applicable under the Paris Agreement in spite of the years
since its adoption.
Whereas the WIM “may be enhanced and strengthened,”60
the Decision of the Parties (“Decision”) also expressly and
indicatively provides that the loss and damage provision of the
Agreement – Article 8 - will “not involve or provide a basis for
any liability or compensation.”61 “This provision was critical
for engendering support by developed countries, who for the
most part opposed [the] creation of potential legal remedies for
climatic impacts,”62 whereas “[m]any developing countries
fought to include a loss and damage provision in the Paris
Agreement, believing that this would increase the issue’s

58. Burns, supra note 6, at 417.
59. U.N. Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 8.
60. Id.
61. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30
November to 11 December 2015, 51 U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec.
12, 2015) [hereinafter Report of the Conference].
62. Burns, supra note 6, at 425.
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saliency in the years to come . . . .”63 Some doubt remains as to
the legal status of the Decision, which may thus not preclude
action for liability. On the other hand, the Decision remains
important for interpreting Article 8 of the Agreement. It
speaks in no uncertain terms about the Parties’ intended
effects of the Agreement on loss and damage liability, namely
to not create “any.” Should it come to any legal action against
nations for loss and damage in the climate change context, this
could be highly determinative despite quibbles regarding the
exact legal effects of one instrument versus the other.
Having said that, it should also be noted that some
nations, such as Micronesia, renounced the attempts by
otherwise potentially liable nations to reject liability as follows:
The Government of the Federated States of
Micronesia declares its understanding that its
ratification of the Paris Agreement does not
constitute a renunciation of any rights of the
Government of the Federated States of
Micronesia under international law concerning
State responsibility for the adverse effects of
climate change, and that no provision in the
Paris Agreement can be interpreted as
derogating
from
principles
of
general
international law or any claims or rights
concerning compensation and liability due to the
adverse effects of climate change.64
This was likely done in order to, and may have the effect
of, preserving Micronesia’s legal rights to claim liability for loss
and damage under the “no harm” principles stemming from,
among other things, the Trail Smelter decision analyzed
further below.
Whereas the preamble to the Paris Agreement mentions
such laudable intentions as “the principle of equity and
common but differentiated responsibility” and “the specific

63. Id. at 424.
64. U.N. Paris Agreement Micronesia Ratification, opened for signature
Apr. 22, 2016 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016).
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needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties,
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change,”65 the preamble is not legally binding
and thus has little, if any, legal effect. In combination with the
parties specifically renouncing the legal liabilities for
financially adverse consequences of climate change on each
other’s territories in the COP Decision, it is fair to say the
Paris Agreement did not bring more hope in the treaty context
as regards financial liability.
Thus, the most relevant provision to loss and damage
under the UNFCCC umbrella is still the WIM. This was
established to address climate change-associated loss and
damage, both in terms of extreme weather and slow-onset
events in vulnerable developing countries.66 The WIM is
tasked with three primary functions, reflecting both functional
modes of action (action approaches) and systemic modes of
actions (signaling areas of concern):67
1. “Enhancing knowledge and understanding
of comprehensive risk management approaches
to address loss and damage.” Methods to
facilitate this will include seeking to address
gaps in knowledge and expertise to address loss
and damage, collection, sharing, management
and use of relevant data and information and a
collation of best practices, challenges and lessons
learned;
2. “Strengthening dialogue, coordination,
coherence and synergies among relevant
stakeholders.” This function is to be effectuated
by spearheading and coordinating assessment
and implementation of approaches to address
loss and damage, and to foster dialogue,
coordination and synergies among pertinent
65. U.N. Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at preamble.
66. Report of the Conference, supra note 61, at art. 8, ¶ 1.
67. Laura Schäfer & Sönke Kreft, Loss and Damage: Roadmap to
Relevance for the Warsaw International Mechanism, GERMANWATCH & BROT
FÜR
DIE
WELT,
Mar.
2014,
at
1,
9-10,
https://germanwatch.org/en/download/9002.pdf.
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stakeholders, institutions and key processes and
initiatives;
3. “Enhancing action and support, including
finance, technology and capacity building.” This
should include providing technical support and
guidance to those seeking to address loss and
damage, information and recommendations to
the Conference of the Parties on how to reduce
risks and manifestations of loss and damage, and
efforts to mobilize expertise, financial support,
technology and capacity-building.68
However, none of these “soft law” provisions are likely to
be able to result in any one nation or region (e.g., the EU) being
held legally liable for the climate change-related loss and
damage incurred by other nations. In addition to the problem
presented by the vagueness of the WIM provisions, the problem
of traceability between one arguably culpable nation or group
of nations and the asserted victim nation remains difficult, as
will be analyzed further below, but also presents an obstacle to
nation state liability for loss and damage caused by climate
change. In short, it is, at best, questionable how effective the
WIM will be in assisting nations seeking to hold other nations
financially liable for loss and damage.
The Paris Agreement does, however:
[S]et[] forth a number of potential areas for
facilitation and cooperation in the context of loss
and damage, including establishment of early
warning systems, emergency preparedness,
responses to slow onset and irreversible events,
comprehensive
risk
assessment
and
management, establishment of risk insurance
facilities, addressing of non-economic losses, and
strategies to enhance resilience of human
institutions and ecosystems.69

68. Burns, supra note 6, at 422.
69. Id. at 425.
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“The Parties also requested that the WIM Executive
Committee establish an information clearinghouse for
insurance and risk transfer mechanisms, as well as a task force
to address climate-related population displacement.”70
“Finally, the Agreement authorized the CMP to enhance and
strengthen the WIM in the future.”71
In short, legal liability for loss and damage caused by
climate change is, on balance, unlikely to arise under the
WIM/UNFCCC regime. The provisions therein are simply too
vague when it comes to a potential finding of liability and, at
the same time, sufficiently clear when it comes to the
renunciation of it. The battle was arguably lost before and
during the Paris Agreement negotiations. Thus, nation states
looking to hold other nations responsible for climate changeinduced financial losses will have to look to other legal venues.
This includes taking a renewed look at the generalized
provisions of international law including customary
international law. These will be analyzed next.
V. State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Acts
“Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State.”72 Nation states may
thus be liable to each other for both direct and indirect legal
wrongs. “A direct wrong arises when one State is in direct
breach of an obligation owed to another State, e.g. the breach of
a treaty” of which both parties are members or the breach of a
customary obligation.73 Indirect liability arises where a state is
in breach of a duty owed to the national of another state, rather
than the state itself.74
Two further bases for state responsibility exist: the “risk”
or “objective” theory of responsibility and the “fault” or
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.N. International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter DARSIWA].
73. KACZOROKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 450, 459.
74. Id. at 450.
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“subjective” theory of responsibility.75 Under the objective
theory, a nation may be held liable for both the acts of the
officials or organs of the state, even in the absence of any
“fault” of its own.76 The Caire Claim (France v. Mexico)
exemplifies this approach: Caire, a French national, was
tortured and killed in Mexico by Mexican soldiers in a failed
ransom attempt.77
In applying the doctrine of objective
responsibility and holding Mexico liable, the President of the
Claims Commission explained that:
[T]he doctrine of “objective responsibility” . . .
may devolve upon [the nation state] even in the
absence of any “fault” of its own . . . The state
also bears an international responsibility for all
acts committed by its officials or its organs which
are delictual according to international law,
regardless of whether the official organ has acted
within the limits of its competence . . .
However, . . . it is necessary that [the officials or
organs] should have acted . . . or that, in acting,
they should have used powers or measures
appropriate to their official character.”78
As regards the way nation states should have acted, they
arguably should have taken (and still should take) greater
steps to alleviate climate change under their duty not to
knowingly allow their territories to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States,79 as will be analyzed next.
The doctrine of objective responsibility appears to have
somewhat
wider
support
than
that
of
subjective

75. Id. at 457.
76. Id.
77. Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5
R.I.A.A. 516, 529-531 (1929).
78. The Basis and Nature of State Responsibility, CHEGE KIBATHI & CO:
LAW LEARNERS (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.ckadvocates.co.ke/2013/12/thebasis-and-nature-of-state-responsibility/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
79. See The Corfu Channel Case (U. K. v. Alb,), Judgment, I.C.J. 4, 22
(1948); Trail Smelter Case (U. S. v. Can.), 3 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS
1905 (1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter Case].
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responsibility.80 However, scholars have also “argued that to
see State responsibility exclusively in the light of either
approach is misleading.”81 The better view is that the “content
of a particular duty—will depend not upon a general principle
but upon the precise formulation of each obligation of
international law.”82
Accordingly, without applying the subjective/objective
differentiation, established principles of international law hold
that every internationally wrongful act is an act or omission on
the part of a State which 1) “is attributable to the State under
international law” and 2) “constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the State.”83
Decades ago, the Trail Smelter arbitration case famously
established the now broadly accepted view that nation states
may be held liable for damages caused by pollution emanating
from facilities in one nation and harming a neighboring state,
even where the facilities at issue are privately owned and thus
arguably not directly attributable to the nation from which the
pollution stems.84 In the case, the United States sued Canada
for violating American sovereignty by allowing Canadian
territory to be used in a manner that caused severe pollution in
the United States.85 At bottom, the case arose as follows:
during the early 20th century, the Canadian zinc and lead
smelting company Cominco was operating in Trail, British
Columbia, a few miles from the American border.86 This
industrial process emitted sulfur dioxide causing injury to
plant life, forest trees, soil, and crop yields in Washington

80. KACZOROKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 459.
81. Id.
82. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, PART 1 40 (1983).
83. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 1, 2.
84. See generally Trail Smelter Case, supra note 79.
85. Id. at 1912-13.
86. Id. at 1913; see Dene Moore, U.S. Ruling Over Teck’s Rail, B.C.
Smelter May Have Ripple Effect, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Dec. 16, 2012, 4:08
PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/thelaw-page/us-ruling-over-tecks-rail-bc-smelter-may-have-rippleeffect/article6459408/ (“[C]omplaints about the contamination from the Trail
smelter surfaced as early as the 1940s, when farmers from Washington state
sued Cominco . . . over air pollution from the smelter.”).
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State.87 American farmers claimed damages from the waste
emitted by the smelter.88 After several rounds of failed
negotiations, the United States charged Canada for these
injuries.89 The case was referred to the International Joint
Commission, a bilateral tribunal overseeing issues regarding
the two countries.90
The tribunal held that it is the
responsibility of a State to protect other states against harmful
act by individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as
well as of the law of the United States, no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence.91
Canada eventually accepted responsibility for the actions
of the smelting plant.92 As a result, Canada was forced to pay
for COMINICO’s past pollution instead of it “conflict resolution
put the onus on Canada to compensate for COMINCO’s past
pollution rather than forcing COMINICO to prevent future
harm to U.S. soil.”93 In addition to the duty not to knowingly
allow a national territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states (the “transboundary harm principle”), the
legacy of this decision also came to include the polluter-pays
principle as well as the duty to establish regulatory regimes to

87. See Catherine Prunella, An International Environmental Law Case
Study: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION ISSUES (Dec.
2014),
https://intipollution.commons.gc.cuny.edu/an-internationalenvironmental-law-case-study-the-trail-smelter-arbitration/ (“Sulfur dioxide
and particulate matter from the metals were the constituents of the smelter
smoke produced at Trail.”).
88. Trail Smelter Case, supra note 79, at 1917.
89. Id. at 1907.
90. Id. at 1918.
91. Id. at 1965.
92. See id. at 1933 (stating “the Dominion of Canada has completely
fulfilled all obligation with respect to the payment [of past damages]”).
93. See supra notes 80, 89.
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prevent environmental degradation, which, in turn, allow
nations to take positive steps to control pollution. The failure
by states to meet these responsibilities may mean that they are
breaching international law.
“Subsequently, the no-harm rule has been incorporated in
various law and policy documents.”94 For example, Principle 21
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration provides that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.95
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, Article 3 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, and the preamble of the UNFCCC repeat Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration almost verbatim.96 Article 194
paragraph 2 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) mention the doctrine that “[s]tates
94. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 1.
95. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5-16, 1972).
96. U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992); U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for
signature June 5, 1992, art. 3 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993); U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (1992). See also U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for signature
May 21, 1997 (entered into force Aug. 17, 2014); U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development, International Tropical Timber Agreement, U.N. Doc.
TD/TIMBER.3/12 (Feb. 1, 2006); U.N. Convention, The Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, opened for signature on May 22, 2001, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/POPS/CONF/4, App. II (2001) (entered into force May 17, 2004);
U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Final Text of the Convention, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.241/27 (Sept. 12, 1994).
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shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to
cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment . . . .”97
“While it has been questioned whether the no-harm rule is
adequately reflected in actual state practice to represent
customary international law, its existence has been
authoritatively confirmed by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).”:98
In the advisory opinion on the threat or use of
nuclear weapons, the ICJ explicitly stated that
“[t]he existence of the general obligation of states
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
and control respect the environment of other
states or of areas beyond national control is now
part of the corpus of international law relating to
the environment”.99
“The Court repeated these findings in the case concerning
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam (Hungary v. Slovakia)100 and
most recently in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).”101
“The Trail Smelter arbitration is widely accepted as the
[foundational basis] for the development of the no-harm rule.102
97. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, art. 194(2) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
98. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. According to the Legal Responsive Initiative:
The latter judgment states that ‘[a] State is thus obliged to
use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities
which take place in its territory, or in any area under its
jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment
of another State.’ Id. In this connection, the ICJ refers to
the no- harm rule as the ‘principle of prevention’ and points
out that as a customary rule it has its origins in the due
diligence that is required of a State in its territory.
Id.
102. Id.
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However, “while the case only dealt with transboundary harm
to other (neighbouring) [sic] states, the Stockholm principles
and other subsequent international agreements also include,
[more broadly], the global commons.”103 “States are under an
obligation to protect the environment of other states and in
areas beyond national jurisdiction from damage caused by
activities on their territory.”104 This notion is not limited to
neighboring states. For example, in a case between Argentina
v. Uruguay, the ICJ stated that “[a] State is [] obliged to use all
the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take
place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction,
causing significant damage to the environment of another
State.”105 Article 2(c) of the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities also defines “transboundary harm” as
“harm caused in the territory of” another state “whether or not
the States concerned share a common border.”106
The 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts provide for two situations in
which a state may be responsible for unlawful acts committed
by private persons namely, under Article 8: 1) when their
conduct is “directed or controlled by a State”107 or, 2) under
Article 11, when their conduct is “acknowledged and adopted
by a State.”108
Further, Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law provides that:
A state is obligated to take such measures as
may be necessary, to the extent practicable
under the circumstances, to ensure that
activities within its jurisdiction or control . . . are
conducted so as not to cause significant injury to
103. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 2.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010
I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 101 (Apr. 2010).
106. U.N. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, art.
2(c), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
107. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 8.
108. Id. at art. 11.
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the environment of another state or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.109
Finally, the preamble to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change clearly states that that “[s]tates
have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.”110 These provisions clearly make the “no
harm” principle applicable in the climate change context:
[T]here
is
a
general
consensus
that
transboundary interference must be “of serious
consequence” and cause at least “significant”,
“substantial” or “appreciable” harm. Minimal,
trivial or simply detectable impacts do not meet
that threshold. A detrimental effect on matters
such as human health, property or agriculture
broadly measurable in monetary terms is
required to trigger the application of the no harm
rule.”111
Nation states may thus, as a starting point, be held liable
for damage to the territory of another nation. This is, in
general, a no fault rule112:
The notion of fault or culpa is particularly
inappropriate in respect of State responsibility
for wrongful acts because: it requires the
discovery of the intentions or motives of a
wrongful act; and it misunderstands the main
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601 (1)(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
110. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (1992).
111. No-harm Rule, supra note 7.
112. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 1, 2; KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND,
supra note 9, at 459.
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purpose of imposing responsibility on a State
which is to restore the equality of states vis-à-vis
their international obligations which has been
disturbed by the commission of a wrongful act.113
The lack of fault may nonetheless still be invoked in some
cases for some limited purposes. For example, the lack of fault
may be invoked as an element of particular excuse doctrines
and thus preclude state responsibility in certain circumstances
as will be analyzed further below. Fault is also taken into
account in the determination of compensation.114 A state may
be held liable where, for example, “it has knowledge of the
circumstances of a wrongful act of another state and
notwithstanding this provides aid and assistance to that
state”115 or “directs and controls another State in the
commission of an internationally wrongful act.”116
A few examples of nations being held responsible for acts
damaging other nations’ territories despite the lack of fault
serve to illuminate the doctrine. When NATO forces led by the
United States mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade, the United States paid damages despite the fact that
no culpability or fault was at issue.117 Similarly, China paid
damages to the United States for mob damage to the United
States diplomatic mission in China during demonstrations
subsequent to the just mentioned bombing.118
As for compensation, a liable nation state must make “full
reparation for the injury caused by the commission of the
internationally wrongful act.”119 This “may take the form of
restitution, compensation or satisfaction, either separately or
in combination.”120
Although climate change poses a typical tragedy-of-thecommons style problem caused by a multitude of nation state
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 459.
Id.
DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 16.
Id. at art. 17.
KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 469.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Id.
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and private actors and is not solvable by any one particular
actor or nation state, it has become increasingly implausible for
at least some nation states to continue to argue that they have
not “caused” or been at “fault” for causing the problem. This
particularly apples to the historically and currently major CO2
emitters such as the USA, EU, China, and India. Clearly,
these and other nations have contributed very significantly to
the substantive problem because of decades of regulatory
inaction and, in the case of some, downright denial of
responsibility for the underlying problem, if not even the very
existence of the problem itself. This weighs in favor of finding
that they can indeed be faulted for the problem caused in such
large part by these nations. The counter-argument in this
context is typically that of causation, namely that so long as a
problem is not sufficiently attributable to one particular actor,
that actor should not bear the legal and financial consequences
of the problem. In other words, the problem remains the
traceability between the polluting activities in each individual
nation and the overall problem.
However, with modern
scientific knowledge, each nation’s historic and current share of
the problem has become known to a sufficiently specific extent
so that liability could, for example, be attributed on a pro-rata
basis reflecting historical CO2 emissions until a certain year
and, thereafter, current emissions. Nation states clearly have
knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongfulness of not
curbing climate change. The fact that many still stall in taking
action in this regard is either irrelevant to the liability
argument or adds to the justifiability of holding them liable.
As a starting point, the standard of liability is, as
mentioned, a no-fault standard.121 Thus, even if a nation state
claims – and, granted, arguably correctly so – that it did not
cause climate change since a multitude of actors did, it suffices
that the particular nation should have acted by taking
appropriate measures against this problem as its causes and
effects became known. It has become reckless for nation states
to continue to ignore a problem of this national and
international severity knowing full well how at least some
action – regulatory and otherwise - could have been and still
121. See DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 1, 2; KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND,
supra note 9, at 459.
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can be taken against it by at least developed nations. Under
Trail Smelter and its progeny, nation states are in violation of
the law where they allow their territories to be used in ways
that cause damage to other nations. Further, “the legal
literature increasingly describes the principle of prevention as
emanating from the concept of due diligence – a standard of
care [attributable to] government authorities.”122 Thus, despite
the foreseeability of events or lack thereof, proportionate
measures which were capable of protecting the environment
were and are often not taken. A state may thus be considered
careless and potentially liable for the resulting harm.
When the injurious action is “controlled” by a state, as is
the case with most CO2-creating activities in developed nations
around the world, nations may be held liable. In addition to
the lack of sufficient regulatory action, nation states still
provide aid and assistance to other states with the knowledge
that the recipient states continue activities that add to the
climate change problem. Although it is, of course, sound
international policy to provide aid and assistance to other
states, the time may well have come to more closely earmark
such assistance to activities that do not further contribute to
climate change. For equitable reasons, the donor states should
then arguably also step up their own climate change-curbing
action so as to not demand more from others than what
developed nations themselves do, but that is the direction
developments in this context need to go anyway.
In short, if developed nations continue to delay or refuse
taking effective steps to curb climate change, they may, under
customary international law and international legal principles,
albeit not the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, incur legal liability
under the no-harm rule. This problem is becoming more and
more relevant as the number and severity of climate changeinduced severe weather events increase. The financial risks
caused by climate change are significant. This is, of course,
precisely why developed nations, who to a very large degree
caused the underlying problem in the first place, now seek to
avoid financial liability. If, however, liability actions are
122. No-harm Rule, supra note 7, at 5. See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN
BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT
143-52, 453 (3d ed. 2009).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/2

26

2017

RETHINKING FORCE MAJEURE

481

brought against them, they are likely to invoke one or more of
the excuse doctrines addressed next.
VI. Excuse for the International Wrongness of State
Acts
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the
following “exculpatory defenses preclude the [legal]
wrongfulness of an act, but not necessarily the responsibility of
the perpetrating State.123 The matter of whether, in a situation
where a State takes action that causes injury to another State
or its nationals, but the action is not unlawful, that State will
still be under an obligation to pay compensation is addressed in
Article 27 of the DARSIWA: “The invocation of a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness . . . is without prejudice to . . . the
question of compensation for any material loss caused by the
act in question.”124 Importantly, thus, is
[t]he fact that an act of State is lawful will not
necessarily mean that the respondent State will
have no duty to pay compensation. In particular,
in a situation of distress or necessity there is no
reason why a State, which acts for its own
benefit, should not pay compensation for any
material harm or loss caused by its act.125
Nonetheless, states would, in all likelihood, first attempt to
seek a determination that their allegedly wrongful acts were
not so from a legal standpoint. This could make their case
against liability stronger as well.
The wrongfulness of an act of a state may be precluded
based on the provisions on force majeure, necessity, or distress.
These doctrines have, among other places been addressed in
detail by the International Law Commission’s Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong Acts (“ILC

123. KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 506 (emphasis added).
124. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 27.
125. KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 453 (emphasis added).
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Articles”).126 The extent to which these provisions may apply to
weather-related losses, and whether such losses can be
attributed to the action or inaction of a nation state, will be
analyzed next.
1. Force Majeure
Article 23 provides that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a
State not in conformity with an international obligation of that
State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the
occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event,
beyond the control of the State, making it materially
impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.”127
Force majeure does not apply if the situation is “due, either
alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the
State invoking it[;] or [if] the state has assumed the risk of that
situation occurring.”128
International tribunals have accepted force majeure, which
is also recognized in the majority of the legal systems around
the world.129 It is a general principle of international law that
applies to a wide range of situations where a nation state has
been “compelled to act in a manner not in conformity with the
requirements of an international obligation incumbent upon it”
because of a superseding event.130 Such an event could be
extreme weather that diverts state aircraft or ships into the
territory of another state or, problems caused by earthquakes,
floods, or drought. “[A] tsunami could damage a nuclear
[power] plant, rendering it impossible for the state to comply
with an international obligation to . . . provide energy to a
neighbouring state.”131 Force majeure might also stem from
human intervention such as the loss of control of a portion of a

126. Articles 23 and 25 may also apply to situations of treaty
withdrawal. However, this is outside the scope of this article.
127. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 23.
128. Id.
129. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 476.
130. U.N. Legislative Series, Materials on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 23, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/25 (2012)
[hereinafter Legislative Series].
131. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 463.
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state’s territory as a result of insurrections or the destruction
of territory by a third state.132 The doctrine of force majeure
has traditionally been invoked in cases where ships and
aircraft were forced into the territory of other nations because
of severe weather.133 The same may, of course, happen in the
future. Drones would fall under the doctrines as well, as might
persons (civilians or military personnel) allegedly “forced” to
cross boundaries to, for example, obtain water in cases of
severe drought. As air streams and water currents may shift
in yet unpredictable ways, pollutants may also enter the
territory of other nations in currently unexpected ways.
The following elements must be satisfied for the defense to
be available: First, the act “must be brought about by an
irresistible or unforeseen event.”134 “Irresistible” means that
“there must be a constraint which the State was unable to
avoid or oppose by its own means.”135 In other words, there can
be no element of free choice that could be exercised by the
nation. “Unforeseen” requires that the event was neither
actually foreseen nor of “an easily foreseeable kind.”136 Second,
the event must have been “beyond the control” of the state.137
Thus, the doctrine does not apply if the situation has been
“brought about by the [state’s own conduct] . . . even if the
resulting injury itself was accidental and unintended.”138 “A
State may not invoke force majeure if it has caused or induced
the situation in question.”139 In other words, the situation
must not be “due, either alone or in combination with other
factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it.”140 However, if
the state has merely “contributed” to the situation, the defense
may still be available under the circumstances of the case.141
In that respect, a good faith standard applies to the analysis of
the degree to which the state “caused” or “contributed to” the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.
Id. at art. 24.
Id. at art. 23.
Id.
Id.
Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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problem.142 Third, the event must have made compliance with
the international obligation “materially impossible” to perform
the obligation.143 In the Rainbow Warrior Arbitration, for
example, France claimed that the urgent repatriation to
France, without the consent of New Zealand, of a member of
the French Secret Service who had placed explosives on the
Rainbow Warrior because of an alleged medical emergency
amounted to an absolute and material impossibility, thus
warranting the excuse of force majeure.144
The tribunal
145
disagreed.
Crucially, in the climate change context, the successful
invocation of force majeure will require more than a situation
having become more difficult in general.146 Mere economic
difficulties or political problems also will not suffice.147 On the
other hand, “the degree of difficulty associated with force
majeure . . . , though considerable, is less than is required”
under other articles that relate to “impossibility,” such as
Article 61, governing the right to withdraw from a treaty.148 In
practice, the defense has failed on this prong in many of the
cases in which it has been invoked.149 Force majeure will also
not excuse a performance “if the State has undertaken to
prevent the particular situation arising or has otherwise
assumed that risk.”150
In the early cases, the doctrine was analyzed in cases of
property damage caused by the outbreak of wars, insurrection
and civil unrest, and pillaging by tribes.151 Only occasionally
did the defense prevail. In one weather-related case, the
Venezuelan government and a French company concluded a
142. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.
143. Id.
144. See U.N. Secretary-General, Ruling on the Rainbow Warrior Affair
Between France and New Zealand, 26 I.L.M.1346 (1987).
145. Id.
146. See generally Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (“In practice, many of the cases where ‘impossibility’ has been
relied upon have not involved actual impossibility as distinct from increased
difficulty of performance and the plea of force majeure has accordingly
failed.”).
150. Id.
151. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 410-11, 414, 419, 420-21.
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contract for the construction of a railway.152 The work was
interrupted by floods, inundations, fires, earthquakes and the
Crespo revolution.153 The French company suspended its
operations and claimed damages for the problems caused by
the natural events and the war.154 Both parties invoked force
majeure: the company “claimed that it had suspended its
operations due to force majeure brought about by the revolution
and the government’s failure to pay” for its debts to the
company.155 The government claimed not to be responsible for
damages caused to the company’s assets because of the natural
events and accidents caused by open fire.156 It also sought to
avoid liability for its debts to the company because of the
war.157 The umpire upheld the Venezuelan government’s plea
of force majeure in relation to the war activities and further
held that the government was not responsible for the
suspension of the company’s operations because the situation
in the country was part of those “misfortunes” which were
“incident to government, to business, and to human life.”158
However, tribunals may very well look differently at weather
situations today. With the availability of scientific knowledge
about what causes weather events, where they will occur, and
the expected degree of severity, nation states may be unlikely
to attribute problems they have arguably caused to mere
misfortunes of life.
More recently, other considerations also highly relevant to
climate change problems have been addressed and reconfirmed
as follows: “Force majeure is ‘generally invoked to justify
involuntary, or at least unintentional conduct.’”159
The
“unforeseen external event [must be one] against which [the
152. French Company of Venezuelan Railroads, 10 R.I.A.A. 285, 335
(1905).
153. Id. at 335-38.
154. Id. at 291, 316.
155. Id. at 287.
156. Id. at 330-31.
157. French Company, supra note 152, at 297, 331-32.
158. Id. at 353.
159. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23 (citing case between
New Zealand and France concerning the interpretation or application of two
agreements concluded on July 9, 1986, between the two States relating to the
problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, arbitral award, 30 April
1990, para. 77, reproduced in UNRIAA, vol. XX, pp 252–253).
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nation] has no remedy. . . .”160 A strict meaning is attached to
this requirement: The constraint must be one “which the State
was unable to avoid or to oppose by its own means . . . The
event must be an act which occurs and produces its effect
without the State being able to do anything which might rectify
the event or might avert its consequences.”161
Does it still follow legally for a nation state to assert force
majeure in defense of such unauthorized entries because of
“extreme” weather? As with the doctrines of good faith and
risk assumption, it is becoming more and more implausible for
at least the historically largest CO2 emitters to continue to
argue that they should, in good faith, be exempt from liability
for the severe problems that are now arising because of historic
(and current) greenhouse gas emissions. The largest emitters
must be said to have assumed that the problem would arise.
To a large extent, they postponed action that could have
remedied some of the worst climatic effects that we are now
beginning to witness. Of course, this stems from a lack of
political will to take such action, but under the law, mere
political difficulties do not warrant a finding of non-liability
under the excuse of force majeure.
Further, it makes less and less common sense to claim that
allegedly extreme or severe weather events causing aircraft,
vessels or even people to enter the territory of another state
without prior consent should be excused because such weather
was not actually foreseen or of an easily foreseeable kind.
Common sense does and should continue to drive the
development of the law as well. With today’s readily available
knowledge about climate change, arguments that almost any
kind of weather-related event that could correctly have been
considered extreme and unforeseeable in the past are becoming
increasingly implausible.
“Extreme weather is rapidly
becoming the new norm [around the globe].”162 What were
previously seen as actually unforeseen, if not altogether
unforeseeable, events are now typically the exact opposite:
160. Id. at art. 23.
161. Id.
162. Mid-Atlantic Transition Hub, MATH Builds Mid-Atlantic Extreme
Weather Resilience, TRANSITION U.S., http://transitionus.org/stories/mathbuilds-mid-atlantic-extreme-weather-resilience (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
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highly foreseeable regarding the frequency, location, time of
year, and degree of severity. They should thus be foreseen as
well. Nation states, as well as private actors, must become
more practically and legally prepared for severe weather posing
more and more problems of increasing severity as experience
has already amply demonstrated by now. The law should come
to reflect this new reality in both the private and public
spheres.
The legal difficulty remains, however, whether the problem
can, narrowly, be said to be due to the actions or inactions of
certain nations or whether these have merely contributed to
the problem, in which case the defenses may still be available.
Clearly, some nations have contributed significantly to the
substantive problem because of decades of regulatory inaction
and, in the case of some, downright denial of responsibility for
the underlying problem, if not even the very existence of the
problem itself. For the defense to lie, the situation must thus
not be due singly or in combination with other factors to the
invoking state.
Some nations persistently rely on the
argument that they could not, by their own means, have
stemmed the problem. Thus, they will argue, they have not
been able to (and are still not able to) “control” the problem and
did not “cause” it; they merely “contributed” to an already
existing problem. In that case, the doctrine might still be
applicable. In other words, the force majeure doctrine requires
a close causal examination of the extent to which other factors
contributed to the problem than the actions of one particular
nation state. A multitude of nations and actors caused climate
change, but notably, the defense may be denied even where
other nations have also not taken sufficient regulatory or other
action. Unilaterality is thus neither a requirement nor a
defense.
Case law also demonstrates that for the defense of force
majeure to lie, the invoking state must not have been able to do
“anything” which “might” rectify the problem or avert its
consequences.163 Mere financial or political difficulties are, as
explained, not enough to warrant the excuse. In the case of
climate change, many developed nations now take active steps
163. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 457.
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to prevent dangerous climate change. Some nations are willing
to step up their efforts even more in the future. For example,
Denmark’s CO2 emissions have already dropped 22% since
1990.164
The EU’s key climate action targets are 20%
greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2020,165 40% by 2030,
and 80-95% by 2050.166 The United States and China have,
finally, also agreed to undertake action against climate change
as have, arguably, all nations under the Paris Agreement. To
some extent, it still remains to be seen if the parties also take
effective steps to live up to the promises. But it remains clear
that nation states can - if the will is there - now take practical,
regulatory, financial and other steps to solve the substantive
problem. For that reason, too, should the availability of force
majeure be scrutinized in relation to potential nation state
liability for loss and damage to the territories of other nations.
A continued reliance on the isolationist argument—since
one particular state or even group of states cannot singularly
curb the problem, the defenses described in this article should
be available—is clearly undesirable from a practical and public
policy point of view. Climate change may soon take on even
worse life-and-death consequences than what is already
thought to be the case,167 not to mention the severe economic
problems that have become traceable to climate change. Since
some nations are now reducing CO2 emissions significantly,
the argument that the actions of one nation or region will not
help are no longer warranted. Every action taken helps and,
perhaps more importantly, spurs even further action by other

164. Ture Falbe-Hansen, Danish Carbon Emissions Continue to Drop,
STATE OF GREEN (May 12, 2014), https://stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/danishenergy-agency/news/danish-carbon-emissions-continue-to-drop.
165. European Commission, 2020 climate & energy package, CLIMATE
ACTION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en (last visited
Apr. 3, 2017).
166. European Commission, 2050 low-carbon economy, CLIMATE ACTION,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en#tab-0-0 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2017).
167. The intense 2003 heat waves in Europe were blamed for more than
70,000 deaths. Wynne Parry, Recent Heat Waves Likely Warmest Since 1500
in
Europe,
LIVE
SCIENCE
(Mar.
17,
2011,
2:02
PM),
http://www.livescience.com/13296-european-russia-heat-waves-climatechange.html.
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nations.168 The argument often raised by some nations in
defense of a general unwillingness to adopt climate change
regulations because of other nations’ alleged unwillingness to
do the same has become unjustifiable in light of the now
increasing action taken by at least some developed nations and
regions, such as the EU. With the availability of knowledge
demonstrating the severe consequences of climate change and
the financial and many other advantages of taking action
sooner rather than later, the international finger-pointing and
responsibility avoidance must stop. This is a serious situation
and can no longer be treated as a race to the bottom at the
national or international governance levels.
Although extreme weather events have, of course, always
caused problems for humankind, with today’s knowledge of the
causes and effects of climate change, it is, in short, becoming
geopolitically unethical and logically unwarranted to continue
to allow nations to prevail on the argument that they were
neither in control of nor able to stem the problem. They were
precisely able to take regulatory or other action against this
very well documented problem of significant international
economic and humanitarian effect, but, in the case of many,
failed to do so. The more they continue to postpone effective
action, the less they should be able to use the excuse doctrines
analyzed in this article.
Force majeure may be denied where, as in private law,
parties assumed the risk of the problem occurring. Nation
states very arguably assume the risk of severe weather-related
problems via their continued political unwillingness to address
the issue sufficiently, effectively, and quickly at the national
levels. Somebody must blink first. Some nations and regions
have. Others should now follow. The required “absolute and
immaterial impossibility” required for the defense to lie is
simply no longer present when parties are currently - or should
be - well aware of what action they can take to stem the
problem. Again, mere political unwillingness to do so does not
warrant a finding that the defense may lie.
Finally, a good faith standard applies to the issue of force
168. See generally Myanna Dellinger, Narrowed Constellations in a
Supranational Climate Change Regime Complex: The “Magic Number” is
Three, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 373 (2014).
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majeure. Some nations may have difficulty prevailing on a
good-faith argument that the problem is not due to their
actions. This is simply implausible in relation to at least the
major historical CO2 emitters.
Granted, clarity of the
causation issue through elaboration of the relevant doctrinal
phraseology or case precedent would now be helpful in the
context of climate change. Under international force majeure
law, nation states quite simply ought no longer be able to rely
on the argument that they have not contributed to the problem.
Again, it is time for this finger-pointing to stop.
The climate change situation is brought about by the
regulatory neglect of some nations. However, neglect may also
work to disqualify nations from successfully using the defense
of force majeure. Notably, even where the resulting injury may
be argued to be “accidental and unintended,” the defense will
still not succeed if neglect or affirmative action by the nation
state has contributed to the problem in the first place.169 This
is indeed the case in relation to many of the major current and
historical CO2 emitters.
The global climate is rapidly altered by the continued
heavy use of fossil fuels and the continuance of problematic
infrastructure patterns, among many other things. Although
customary international law has long recognized the right of a
state to exploit and use natural resources within its territory
and poses few, if any, limits to how a nation state may chose to
build its internal infrastructure, some limits are nonetheless
imposed internationally on the related rights and duties when
such exploitation patterns cause transboundary harm to the
territory of another state, at least under theories described
above. In practice, not many cases have yet analyzed and
emphasized this point, but with the losses that are likely to be
attributable to climate change, this situation may very well
change in the near future.

169. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23.
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2. Necessity
Article 25 of the United Nations Legislative Series
Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrong Acts provides that:
Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act
not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the
only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest
of the State or States towards which the
obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole.170
In similarity with Article 23 on force majeure, necessity
may not be invoked if the State has contributed to the situation
of necessity.171 In contrast to Article 23, however, Article 25
allows for an element of voluntariness in the choice of actions
and thus conduct that may be “deliberate, voluntary, not
involuntary, [or] intentional” whereas force majeure involves
conduct that is involuntary or coerced.172
It is important to note that the definition of necessity is
read very narrowly and presupposes an absolute impossibility
of taking other course of action than that which led to the
violation of an international obligation. Necessity may excuse
the wrongful act, but a state may still be obliged to make
compensation.
In contrast to force majeure, necessity does not depend on
the prior conduct of the state and “does not involve conduct
which is involuntary or coerced.”173 The situation of necessity

170. Id. at art. 25 (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 466 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 25.
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“may be caused by the ‘foreseeable but unavoidable
consequences of facts which have long been present.’”174 The
same underlying events could give rise to both the defense of
necessity and force majeure. For example, a tsunami making it
impossible for a nation state to deliver electricity to another as
mentioned above may also damage cultivated land, thus
creating a food emergency for the population of a state causing
it to disregard its antecedent international obligations to
provide food for another state out of necessity.175 Necessity
relates to future action, whereas force majeure relates to
current action.
Necessity must be established from an
objective point of view, although some measure of uncertainty
will not preclude use of the plea as long as the state can prove,
with some degree of uncertainty, that the threat of harm is not
merely apprehended or contingent.176 For example, in one case,
the completion of a system of water locks was considered to
result in future environmental harm.177 This harm allegedly
required prophylactic action. The state in question could not,
however, prove to any degree of certainty that ecological harm
would in fact occur; although the Court rejected the plea on the
facts, it upheld the principle of ecological necessity in
protecting the environment as an “essential interest of the
state.”178 Environmental concerns thus clearly form part of the
doctrine.
The requirement that the action taken must be the “only
way” to safeguard the essential interest at stake does not
require the action to be unilateral. In fact, the action may also
“comprise other forms of conduct available through cooperative
action with other States or through international
organizations.”179 Good faith in such cooperation is, of course,
to be expected from the global governance community. The
concept is elusive, but might not be stretched so far as to result
in the imposition of financial liability on nation states with a
174. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 462 (citing Ago, Eighth Report – Add. 57, 14 (para. 2)).
175. Id. at 463.
176. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 42 (Sept. 25, 1997).
177. Paddeu, supra note 10, at 465.
178. Id.
179. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 25.
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current or historical great impact on climate change.
Necessity is, in short, used to “denote those exceptional
cases where the only way a State can safeguard an essential
interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is . . . not to
perform some other international obligation of lesser weight or
urgency.”180 It governs situations of grave danger to the
essential interests of the nation state itself or to the
international community as a whole.181 The doctrine forms
part of customary international law.
Case law demonstrates the ways in which the doctrine
could find relevance in today’s environmentally and resourcestressed world. Recall that the extent of the necessity must be
“imminent and urgent,”182 which is the case with the level of
species extinction currently looming on the horizon. In the
“Russian Fur Seals controversy of 1893, . . .” [Russia argued
that] the ‘essential interest’ to be safeguarded against a ‘grave
and imminent peril’ was the natural environment” and the
extinction of a species considered necessary for economic
reasons.183 Russia “issued a decree prohibiting sealing in an
area of the high seas” that was not subject to the jurisdiction of
any state or international regulation citing to the essential
precautionary character of the measures.184 Similarly, where
regulatory measures were considered ineffective to conserve
straddling stocks of Greenland halibut threatened with
extinction, Canada arrested a Spanish fishing ship on the basis
of necessity.185 In yet another case, the British government
bombed a shipwrecked Liberian oil tanker to protect the
English coastline.186 The British government did not advance
any other legal theory for its conduct other than necessity.187
No international protest resulted.188
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 2 LORD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 232 (1956).
183. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 25.
184. Id.
185. Case Concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment,
1998 I.C.J. 432, at 54 (Dec. 4, 1998).
186. See generally Albert E. Utton, Protective Measures and the “Torrey
Canyon”, 9 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1968).
187. Id.
188. Id.

39

494

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37:2

Species extinction concerns are also of modern relevance
given the current threat of mass extinction of species. Climate
change will affect the survivability of species. Further, as food
and shortages crises are recognized to have the potential to
lead to not only broad human and animal survival problems,
but perhaps even civil unrest or international armed conflict,
necessity may be argued in defense of action to protect a
nation’s food or water supplies. This has already been done,
although to a smaller scale than what may be the case in the
future.
In one dispute, for example, “the Portuguese
government argued that the pressing necessity of providing for
the subsistence of certain contingents of troops engaged in
quelling internal disturbances justified its appropriation of
property owned by British subjects . . . .”189
In short, necessity has been invoked to protect “a wide
variety of interests, including safeguarding the environment,
preserving the very existence of the State and its people in time
of public emergency, or ensuring the safety of a civilian
population.”190 The relevance to climate change and natural
resource shortages as an excuse doctrine is obvious. The lack
of regulatory action may, however, be seen as the “conduct”
that will preclude a nation state from arguing force majeure in
the extreme weather context. Other regions or nations may, by
way of contrast, seek to exceed the regulatory limits
established by such bodies as the WTO and the EU or under
international conventions for habitat- or species-protective
reasons.
If unilateral prohibitions on conduct otherwise
allowed under international law were to be instigated, as was
the case in the Russian Fur seal case, economic necessity may,
arguably, once again be raised in defense of taking such
prohibitory action. This argument arguably has even more
relevance today than before. As cases have also demonstrated,
one nation may avoid international repercussions for the arrest
of other nations’ persons or vessels where such action can be
successfully argued to be the “only way” for a state to protect
imminently endangered species. As species such as certain
large cats, polar bears, rhinos and elephants are now at the
189. DARSIWA, supra note 72, at art. 25. See also MCNAIR, supra note
182, at 232.
190. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 25.
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brink of extinction, nations might, for example, arrest persons
on the territory of other nations in alleged last-ditch effort to
save the species. Where such action violates international law,
the nation(s) at issue may well be able to raise the defense of
necessity successfully now as has been done in the past.
On the human front, research has already demonstrated
the problems that may be caused by future mass migrations of
people because of droughts, unrest, and even potential wars
caused by climate issues (the “climate refugee” problem). Some
nations may seek to reject large amounts of climate refugees,
citing to their own lack of resources and other economic issues.
Whether current or future human rights and other legal
obligations sufficiently cover this issue is beyond the scope of
this analysis.
However, it is established international
necessity law that a nation may take measures “for the
protection of its own essential security interests.”191 As the
climate change problem worsens into a situation posing greater
and greater risks of national, as well as international, security
issues, necessity may well be argued successfully in attempts to
limit migrants from entering another nation’s territory where
the rejecting nation can point to its own grave and imminent
problems. As has often been mentioned in this context, few
nations are likely to be willing to host all the refugees from, for
example, Bangladesh, suffering from vast flooding problems.
Nations are unlikely to raise or, of course, succeed on an
argument that they are simply not willing to host such climate
refugees, but if they can cite to their own objective inability to
do so, the matter changes legally under the defenses analyzed
here.
Climate geo-engineering has also recently gained much
theoretical, if not yet much practical, traction as a potential,
albeit risky, “Band-Aid” solution to climate change until more
viable and less risky solutions are identified. Many legal
challenges surface in this context. An important one of these is
who, if anyone, can and should regulate potential geoengineering implementation activities. So far, no international
regulatory framework is directly on point. A rogue nation or
even private actors may, in the not too distant future, decide to
191. KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 505.
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implement some of the most “promising” technologies, such as
solar radiation management to protect the local climate (e.g.
more shade and rain in a given region) or to test the applicable
engineering theories. If accused of violating any potentially
applicable laws by or harming other nations that see those
activities as threats and not potential solutions to the
temperature increase problem, a nation might assert necessity
in defense. The same considerations mentioned above would
apply. The international community should timely prepare
itself legally for the likelihood that geo-engineering activities
may soon be implemented by private actors or nations no
longer able to, for example, grow sufficient crops or provide its
population with sufficient water because of rising
temperatures. That preparation includes considering risk and
the doctrines mentioned in this article.
As with the doctrine of force majeure, the foreseeability
element and good faith standard apply, but can arguably not be
satisfied by nation states who now, for quite some time, have
known about the dire consequences of climate change, yet are
only now beginning to take some action – arguably not even
enough – to mitigate the problem. Nation states who have
contributed significantly to a certain problem should not at the
same time be able to invoke the defense of necessity. Most
developed nations have indeed contributed significantly to the
problem in a manner for which responsibility is allocable, given
legal and political will to do so, by examining the historical
contributions and assigning liability on a relative basis.
Importantly, the doctrine cannot be invoked if it impairs
an essential interest of the international legal community in
general or a smaller number of other nations in particular.
That is clearly the case with climate change. Nations that
have both contributed significantly to the problem, yet at the
same time seek to avoid financial responsibility for the nowapparent consequences, thereof ought not be able to invoke the
doctrine of necessity. This is so because they precisely place
other nations, and indeed the entire global community, at
grave risk of financial and indeed human, animal, and plant
viability outfalls if they continue to not take sufficient and
sufficiently urgent action against climate change. The latter is
arguably still the case despite some dawn on the horizon in the
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form of the Paris Agreement and some national and
subnational action.
Conversely, nations may well be entitled to use the
doctrine of necessity where they take action to protect species
or human populations from grave peril, such as death or, in the
case of animals, species extinction. For example, nations may
seek to protect supplies of food and water supplies in crossboundary situations as these resources become increasingly
scarce in a rapidly warming world. If one water-importing
nation invaded another to ensure continued water supplies
from the exporting nation, the importing nation could arguably
assert the defense of necessity.
Similarly, and as
demonstrated, nations have been excused from the
wrongfulness of their acts where they undertook such acts
against other nations in order to protect species, even for
financial reasons. They may arguably do so again as we are, as
a global community, already facing a sixth mass extinction that
is exacerbated by climate change. Necessity may well be found
to lie in such cases.
Taking cross-border action to, for example, obtain
resources in times of urgency may appear problematic, enough
even if only of a temporary nature, but worse yet, the steps
that may be taken by increasingly desperate nations in a more
and more distressed natural environment may not end if
resources were to be obtained in the short run. Imagine the
following: a region or nation becomes so frustrated with
another nation not taking effective action against the long-term
ecological problems caused by coal-fired power plants that the
frustrated nation sends drones into the recalcitrant nation to
destroy some or all such power plants in that nation. This is
clearly a violation of international law. The infringing nation
argues ecological necessity asserting that action had to be
taken, even though it admits it is not entirely certain that the
action taken will ultimately stem the underlying problem at
issue (climate change). Recall that such arguments have been
raised successfully in much less controversial cases even
though actors in those cases were also not certain that the
harm complained of would, in fact, occur. In contrast, with
today’s knowledge of climate change, government entities, as
well as private actors, do know that ecological harm will arise
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from a continued heavy use of fossil fuels. Protection of the
environment is an established legal objective and mandate in
many arenas. When it comes to the defenses analyzed in this
article, environmental protection has been held to be an
essential interest of the state. Nations may prevail on defenses
in this context even in what may currently be seen as an
extreme and provocative instance of action against the property
of another state. Recall that no international complaints were
raised when Britain destroyed a Liberian oil tanker in order to,
precisely, protect the environment. Case precedent does allow
for some unilateral action without antecedent consent as long
as, of course, the other doctrinal elements set forth above are
met.
The question also arises whether nations may rely
defensively on the doctrine of necessity in actively seeking to
stem the underlying problem of climate change. For example,
if one nation invaded another to forcibly stop the production of
energy from coal- or oil-fired power plants, may the invading
nation excuse itself because of necessity? As demonstrated,
precautionary ecological interests are clearly covered by the
doctrine. To protect not only animal species, as have been done
in the past, but also human populations as well as food and
water supplies, it is not unthinkable that one nation state may
raise this argument in this manner in the future. For example,
consider the current extreme drought in the American
Southwest and Northern Mexico affecting both United States
and Mexico agriculture and water supplies. The Colorado
River is running lower and lower, causing problems for farmers
in Mexico and the United States alike. Could Mexico claim
necessity in entering U.S. territory to extract water from the
upstream portions of the river where water may still be
available? Looking north, could a future, even further parched,
USA enter Canada for urgent water needs to avoid human
deaths? Conversely, if Mexico continues to build more coalfired power plants, could a future U.S. government more keenly
interested in curbing climate change than what has been the
case so far enter Mexico to physically prevent the construction
of such facilities or to demolish existing ones relying on
necessity, seeking to protect scarce water resources in the
American Southwest that are imperiled by climate change? In
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the water examples, certainly an “essential interest” as well as
a grave and imminent peril are involved if water is not
available for drinking purposes. Recall that the subsistence of
contingencies of troops has been invoked as grounds for
necessity. Where the very survival of a nation’s population
may be at stake for lack of water, or even food, it is not
unthinkable that a nation state might seek and become
excused from international liability for such urgent action out
of necessity in the future. Existing case law supports this, as
demonstrated above. Of course, this would seem to require
that the nation seeking to invoke the necessity doctrine “comes
to the law with clean hands” and thus does not continue to
contribute to climate change in as major ways as is currently
the case with, for example, the United States in the above
example.
3. Distress
Finally, Article 24 may be invoked as a defense to the
international wrongfulness of an act of state; however, this
doctrine only applies in the very limited circumstances where
human life is at immediate risk.192 The doctrine applies in:
the specific case where an individual whose acts
are attributable to the State is in a situation of
peril, either personally or in relation to persons
under his or her care. The article precludes the
wrongfulness of conduct . . . in circumstances
where the agent had no other reasonable way of
saving life.193
As with Articles 23 and 25, an excuse under Article 24 is
not available if “the situation of distress is due, either alone or
in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State
invoking it.”194 “In practice, cases of distress have mostly
involved aircraft or ships entering State territory under stress
192. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 24.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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of weather or following mechanical or navigational failure” in
order to save the life of passengers.195
This doctrine may become relevant in the climate context.
Could the doctrine, for example, be invoked by public utility
leaders in parts or all of nations urgently needing water or
energy for air-conditioning during extreme heat spells to save
citizens in the affected regions if such leaders physically
retrieved, without prior permission, resources that may not be
available in the agent’s own nation from another nation? For
example, the summers of 2003 and 2013 saw extreme heat
waves and numerous resulting deaths in large portions of
Southern Europe196 where nations have traditionally had both
sufficient water as well as electricity for air-conditioning (even
though people in that part of the world have not historically
relied much on air-conditioning). As summer temperatures in
Southern Europe and coastal parts of the Middle East are now
often in the very high 30s to low 40s Celsius (105-107 degrees
Fahrenheit) or more in summer,197 could leaders of power
providers in affected nations such as Syria forcibly tap into
energy lines in neighboring Turkey, or Albania into those in
Greece, for electricity using the defense of necessity? Would
economically hard-hit Greece be able to rely on the doctrine of
distress or necessity to take resources from neighboring or
nearby nations for urgent relief reasons without prior
permission? Italy, for example, is arguably not much better off
195. Id.; KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 505.
196. France Heat Wave Death Toll set at 14,802, USA TODAY (Sept. 25,
2003, 9:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/news/2003-09-25france-heat_x.htm# (discussing how deaths were occurring after recordbreaking summer temperatures); Rosa Silverman, Heatwave Deaths: 760
Lives Claimed by Hot Weather as High Temperatures Continue, TELEGRAPH
(July
18,
2013,
7:09
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/weather/10187140/Heatwave-deaths-760lives-claimed-by-hot-weather-as-high-temperatures-continue.html
(noting
how between 540 and 760 deaths in London could be attributed to the heat in
2013).
197 Tom Di Liberto, Summer heat wave arrives in Europe, CLIMATE.GOV
(July
14,
2015),
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/eventtracker/summer-heat-wave-arrives-europe; Jon Erdman, Heat Records
Shattered in Germany, France, The Netherlands in June/July 2015 Europe
Heat Wave, THE WEATHER CHANNEL (July 7, 2015, 10:15 AM),
https://weather.com/forecast/news/europe-heat-wave-record-highs-june-july2015.
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than Greece economically. Could it, under any of these
defenses, withdraw resources from much wealthier neighboring
Switzerland? Southwestern Europe is not often thought of as a
hotbed for international strife because of the lack of natural
resources or electricity, but as resources of various kinds are
becoming more and more scarce, what has so far been
considered a given in international relations – for example,
that no highly severe energy or resource conflicts would arise
in at least Western Europe – may well become a legally
challenging issue in the not too distant future in a world with
rapidly rising temperatures and the resulting practical,
economic and legal changes. The diplomatic and pragmatic
solutions of yesteryear may simply not suffice in the future.
It is then that the above excuses may see a renewed
importance for which the international legal community should
be prepared. Importantly, however, even though the pure legal
wrongfulness of an act is precluded, a perpetrating nation state
may, as analyzed above, still be held responsible for the loss
caused to another nation.198 As climate change continues to
intensify, the issue of loss, damage, and liability is likely to
become much more legally prevalent in the near future.
VII. Conclusion
Climate change poses a severe risk of financial and
economic problems for individuals, companies, and nation
states around the world. As the negotiations and conclusion of
the Paris climate change agreement show, developed nations
are unwilling to accept legal liability for loss and damage
caused by climate change. Provisions of other international
law could, however,, nonetheless result in a finding that
nations causing such damage to other nations are financially
liable, even if the nation state causing the problem did not act
in internationally wrongful ways if prevailing under one of the
excuse doctrines as analyzed above.
A solution under customary international law as analyzed
in this article may not be the most obvious or, granted, even
the best way of apportioning financial liability for the injuries
198. KACZOROWKSA-IRELAND, supra note 9, at 506 (emphasis added).
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that we know are likely to arise because of climate change.
Lawsuits are always risky and unpredictable. This is even
more so on somewhat uncertain legal grounds such as the ones
analyzed here. It would be better if the world community
would have simply accepted the risks and, under the UNFCCC,
agreed to shoulder the burden equitably and proportionally.
That currently does not seem to be the case. Similarly, the
international legal climate framework should come to include
definitions and rights of climate refugees. Microfunding for
particularly vulnerable areas should become feasible, as should
better risk insurance programs. But these things are not yet
politically feasible, so until this becomes the case, all options
for financial burden-sharing should remain on the table.
One of the current major problems of establishing liability
for climate change is the perception that “it is impossible to
draw a causal connection between one state[‘s] emissions and a
[particular] natural disaster that leads” to damage.199 This
difficulty has said to make the liability approach untenable.200
Instead:
[A] shared-responsibility approach to climate
[change] policy . . . would call upon the
international community to assist in the
realization of economic, social, and cultural
rights not only for all victims of climate harm,
but for all people worldwide . . . States would be
expected to help protect and restore rights
through climate adaptation not on the basis of
their contribution to climate change, but on the
basis of universally shared “obligations to fulfill
human rights for all.”201
That is a very laudable idea, but as analyzed above,
nations states are continuing rather than reversing their long
history of shirking financial and practical responsibility for
199. See, e.g., Rachel Payne, Climate Change, Basic Rights, and
International Obligations, THE YALE REV. OF INT’L STUD. (2012),
http://yris.yira.org/essays/681 (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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climate change. Developed nations are simply not currently
willing to voluntarily undertake the financial responsibility of
their historic and ongoing carbon dioxide emissions. One can
hope that they will realize the fairness in doing so, but neither
does history show this to be the case nor is there little realistic
hope that this situation will change any time soon. In the
meantime, it is proving more and more likely that many
victims – nation states and individuals – will “go
uncompensated and suffer.”202
Human rights law is not more helpful. In the past, human
rights law has seldom been used to promote a particular
distribution of burdens to achieve a rights objective that could
also find use in the climate change context with today’s
knowledge of the implications caused by so-called “extreme”
weather. “International obligations to assist developing states
in fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights are[,] [for
example,] left very vague in the [International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural rights].”203 In fact, the Covenant
only requires states to provide “international assistance and
cooperation” to achieve the realization of rights.204 “Because
the Covenant does not specify a minimum level of foreign
assistance”205 and because nation states are likely to look at
this as a non-binding mandate anyway, “human rights law has
not been read as establishing specific obligations for the
international community. Even making good on the oftreiterated promise by OECD countries to give 0.7% of GNI as
official development assistance has rarely been described as a
duty under human rights law.”206
Thus, returning to
traditional liability for damage caused to another nation as in,
for example, the Trail Smelter case, may currently be the most
viable option that nations have for obtaining financial
assistance in relation to damage caused by other nations’
historical and continued contributions to and exacerbation of
climate change.
Although
treaty
adoption,
adherence
and
exit
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Payne, supra note 199.
Id.
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considerations are beyond the scope of this article, one
important aspect should, however, be addressed because of its
clear relevance to the analyses in this article, namely the
UNFCCC. “The ultimate objective of this treaty is to achieve
the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’”207 The
2015 Paris Agreement similarly seeks to limit the increase in
the global average temperature to “well below 2°C above preindustrial levels, and [to] pursu[e] efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” by
2100.208 The principle pacta sunt servanda requires nation
states to, in good faith, observe the obligations of treaties to
which they are parties whether they are, strictly seen, legally
binding or not. However, nations may seek to avoid even such
treaty goals without, arguably, having to face repercussions
from the international legal community under the necessity
and force majeure defenses. This is so because Articles 23 and
25 also apply to situations of treaty withdrawal. But notably,
“force majeure [will] not excuse [a] performance if the State has
undertaken to prevent the particular situation . . . or has
otherwise assumed the risk.”209 This is precisely the case
under the UNFCCC umbrella. For that reason, the nations
that are party to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement may
indeed not be able to invoke force majeure in relation to a
possible future claim that the nation states simply cannot live
up to the treaty obligations and thus should be allowed to
withdraw from a treaty without following normal procedures
for doing so. The current great amount of inaction in solving
the substantive problem of climate change is, in fact, assuming
the known risks of climate change.
Further, the requirement that there be “no other way” to
solve an imminent and grave problem than by taking certain
action otherwise prohibited under international law may
207. GLOBAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY, ADDRESSING CLIMATE
CHANGE
3,
http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/data/gtsp/docs/GTSPindfind.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2017); U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, art. 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (1992).
208. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the
Paris Agreement, art. 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015).
209. Legislative Series, supra note 130, at art. 23 (emphasis added).
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encompass an obligation to cooperate with other states or
international organizations. In few international legal contexts
has this requirement been as blatantly disregarded by some
nations such as the United States and Australia as in relation
to climate change action.
Thus, if it came to certain
recalcitrant nations such as these attempting to invoke the
above defenses under international law, question marks could
and should correctly be raised in response to such arguments
as they related to extreme weather and climate change.
In sum, all three defenses analyzed above rely on a level of
nation state “innocence” and inability to prevent what was
previously seen as “extreme” weather events that is currently
no longer warranted, given modern scientific knowledge about
the causes and effects of climate change. Several nation states
have, for a very long time, contributed actively, knowingly and
significantly to the underlying pollution problem. Several
nations displayed neglectful, if not outright reckless, behavior
in this context. Granted, it has been and still is very difficult to
reach an effective global political solution to the climate change
problem. That being said, it very arguably defies logic and
common sense to excuse certain nations from international
liability based on force majeure or necessity for the reasons
mentioned above. A hard look at these defense doctrines is
currently warranted to ensure that they match modern reality.
This may, however, require a geopolitical degree of willingness
that is lacking in relation to liability for climate-related
problems as it is in relation to effective international solutions
to the broader issue of climate change itself. However,
international political reluctance should no longer be used as
an excuse for not taking all the action that all governance
entities in various nations can take to curb climate change.
With the Paris Agreement and other new legal developments at
the national and subnational levels in, for example, the United
States and China, there is fortunately hope that some nations
will lead the way forward in this important race. This race
should be one to the top, not the bottom.
For the very significant public policy reason of seeking to
finally bring about the required effective action against climate
change by nations that have so far sought to avoid taking such
action, the force majeure, necessity and distress doctrines
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should, in potential future judicial applications, be critically
examined before being applied in relation to the nations that
have contributed or still contribute a large extent to the super
wicked problem known as climate change. For the reasons
described in this article, such nations should not be able to
invoke the excuse doctrines in order to obtain a holding of no
legal wrongdoing. Even if they are successful in so doing, they
might be held liable for the damage caused to other nations by
their regulatory inaction. From one point of view, this would
be breaking new legal ground as no such liability has yet been
assigned at the international plane in the climate change
context. But from another point of view, holding nation states
liable for damage caused to the territory of other nations
simply harks back to the legal principles and ethical notions
invoked as early as in the Trail Smelter case. Ultimately,
holding nations financially liable for action that they, with the
availability of much modern knowledge, could and should have
known would cause problems for others might be unpopular to
some, but would only be fair to others. At the end of the day,
however, law is about fairness and equity. Although that
might require an involuntary redistribution of funds in the
climate change loss and damage context, such action would
both achieve more fairness, but also send a strong signal to
rectify the underlying problem. Ways of doing so have become
possible. More are surfacing. It is time for nations to act in the
right way, taking the risks posed to other nations into account.
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